THE TOLLING PROVISION OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONSA HAVEN FOR THE DILATORY PLAINTIFF

In New Jersey a personal injury action must be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrues, 1 absent some disability that suspends the running of the limitation period. 2 In addition to the stipulated disabilities, the New Jersey Legislature has provided that if the person against whom the action is to be brought is
not a resident of the state, or if the defendant in the action is a
foreign corporation unrepresented within the state, the statute of
limitations for personal injuries will be "tolled" during the period of
3
such nonresidence or nonrepresentation.

I The statute of limitations for personal injury actions, section 2A:14-2 of New Jersey Statutes Annotated, provides:
Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced within 2 years
next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952).
.2 The disabilities affecting the limitation period are codified in section 2A:14-21 of New
Jersey Statutes Annotated.
If any person entitled to any of the actions or proceedings specified in sections
2A:14-1 to 2A:14-8 or sections 2A:14-16 to 2A:14-20 of this title or to a right or title
of entry under section 2A:14-6 of this title is or shall be, at the time of any such
cause of action or right or title accruing, under the age of 21 years, or insane, such
person may commence such action or make such entrv, within such time as limited
by said sections, after his coming to or being of full age or of sane mind.
Id. § 2A:14-21.
Also, section 2A:14-23 provides that if the person against whom the cause of action is
brought dies before the limitation period, "the space of 6 months next succeeding such death
shall not be computed as a part of the period of time within which the action is required by this
section to be commenced." Id. § 2A:14-23.
The New Jersey tolling provision, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-22, provides as follows:
If any person against whom there is any of the causes of action specified in
sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-5 and 2A:14-8, or if any surety against whom there is a
cause of action specified in any of the sections of article 2 of this chapter, is not a
resident of this state when such cause of action accrues, or removes from this state
after the accrual thereof and before the expiration of the times limited in said sections, or if any corporation or corporate surety not organized under the laws of this
state, against whom there is such a cause of action, is not represented in this state
by any person or officer upon whom summons or other original process may be
served, when such cause of action accrues or at any time before the expiration of
the times so limited, the time or times during which such person or surety is not
residing within this state or such corporation or corporate surety is not so represented within this state shall not be computed as part of the periods of time
within which such an action is required to be commenced by the section. The
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The "tolling provision" originally served an important function.
At the time the statute was enacted, the jurisdictional power of a
state did not extend beyond its borders. 4 The legislature provided a
remedy whereby the plaintiff's action would be saved from the operation of the statute of limitations so long as the nonresidency of the
defendant prevented the plaintiff from bringing the defendant before
the courts of New Jersey.
As a result of developments in the law of in personam jurisdiction, the state's power to acquire jurisdiction over persons beyond its
borders has drastically increased. The nonresidency of the defendant
no longer poses a conclusive barrier to the plaintiff in maintaining his
action. Yet the New Jersey courts, construing the inflexible language
of the statute, have determined that the nonresidents' amenability to
5
suit has no effect on the tolling provision.
The purpose of this comment is to illuminate the deficiencies in
this statutory scheme in light of the modern changes in the law of in
personam jurisdiction. Under the current statutory framework, a
plaintiff maintaining an action against a nonresident has the option to
proceed or postpone; the defendant is conclusively denied the right
to interpose the defense of the statute of limitations. Through the
plaintiff's utilization of long-arm procedures, in addition to deriving
the benefit of the suspension of the limitation period, the nonresident
defendant may be continually subject to the jurisdiction of the New
Jersey courts while remaining totally unaware that an injured party is
contemplating suit. The operation of the tolling provision poses a severe hardship to nonresidents in preparing an adequate defense,
creates an irrational classification in regard to nonresident defendants
amenable to service of process, and flaunts the purpose and intent of
the statute of limitations.
Historical Development of the Tolling Statute
Statutes of limitation represent important policy determinations.
They are designed to "promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have

person entitled to any such action may commence the same after the accrual of the

cause therefor, within the period of time limited therefor by said section, exclusive
of such time or times of nonresidence or nonrepresentation.

ld. § 2A:
t1-22.
" See notes 12-16 infra and accompanying text.
5 See notes 36--47 infra and accompanying text.
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disappeared." 6 A recognition that each individual must be -afforded a
fair opportunity to prepare a defense lies at the foundation of the
statutes. They operate to secure a right of action for a designated
period while "pronot[ing] repose by giving security and stability to
human affairs." 7 The extinguishment of the right to seek redress signifies a determination that, in time, the right to be free of stale
8
claims takes precedence over the right to prosecute the claim.
Thus, mere delay, extending beyond the designated limit, forecloses
the opportunity to proceed. 9
The policy considerations underlying the statute of limitations are
served only when the plaintiff has the ability to prosecute his claim.
If the injured party is incapable of pursuing his action due to a disability at the time the cause of action accrues, allowance must be made
for the period of incapacity. As early as 1623, Parliament had adopted
such a "saving clause" or "tolling provision" 10 which was carried over
into the United States and borrowed by numerous state legislatures
in their initial statutory compilations."
In New Jersey, the tolling
provision remained substantially identical to the Parliamentary statute
until 1820 when the legislature added a provision tolling the limitation period if the defendant in an action was not "resident in this
state . . . or . . . remove[d] from this state" 12 after the cause of action accrued.
The purpose of suspending the limitation period for the duration
of the defendant's absence from the territorial borders of the state
was clear, and, at that time, eminently sound. In light of the dispositive doctrine espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Pen-

6

Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49

(1944).
7 Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).

Id.
9 Id.
10 The parliamentary statute that had the greatest impact upon statutes of limitation adopted
by the states in colonial times was 21 James 1, c.16 (1623). See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S.
8

135, 139 (1879). In addition to creating time limitations for specific actions, the statute specified
that certain disabilities would toll the limitation period. 21 James 1, c. 16 (1623). The limitation
period was "saved" if the person entitled to the action was "within the Age of Twenty-one
years, Femme Covert, Non compos mentis, imprisoned or beyond the Seas." Id.
" See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879). The parliamentary statute was in effect in

New Jersey until 1799, when it was supplemented by an act promulgated by the New Jersey
Legislature. 1799 N.J. Laws 410-13.
12 1820 N.J. Laws 670. In 1949 the statute was amended to include unrepresented foreign
corporations within its purview and to continue its operation in all other respects. 1949 N.J.
Laws 495 (amending N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:24-7 (1937)) (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:14-22 (West 1952)). See note 3 supra.
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noyer v. Neff,13 no state could "extend its process beyond [its] territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions." 14
Accordingly, a person entitled to an action arising within the state
was wholly deprived of the opportunity to sue an out-of-state defendant in the courts of the state wherein the activity giving rise to the
controversy transpired. Thus, in order to ensure an adequate remedy
to an aggrieved person without the hardship of being forced to travel
to a foreign jurisdiction to enforce his claim, the prescribed limitation
period would run from the time that the alleged wrongdoer became
subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state.' 5
The Effect of the Expansion of In Personam Jurisdiction
The tolling provisions prevented a conclusive bar of legitimate
claims and provided remedial aid from the strict jurisdictional limitations mandated by Pennoyer. Rapid developments in transportation
and commerce, however, eroded the strict territoriality of states and
required new remedies. The need for nonresidents to answer for
their conduct in the state where the alleged injury occurred became
critical with the increasing mobility associated with the expansion of
automobile traffic. Seeking to place nonresidents on an equal footing
with residents in regard to compliance with state law, state legislatures enacted measures to acquire jurisdiction over nonresident
motorists. 16 Statutes creating "substituted" service of process were
premised on the fiction that in using the highways of the state, a
nonresident had "impliedly consented" to the appointment of a state
official as his agent upon whom process could be served. 17 The Supreme Court determined that this method of acquiring in personam
jurisdiction was consistent with due process 18 so long as the statutes
creating substituted service of process ensured a "reasonable probability that . . . the defendant [would] receive actual notice."' 9

13 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

14 id. at 722.
15 The rationale forwarded by the courts of that era was that it was the "duty of the debtor
to seek the creditor, and pay him his debt, at the residence of the latter." Chemung Canal Bank
v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72, 77 (1876); see Beardsly v. Southmayd, 15 N.J.L. 171 (Sup. Ct. 1835).
16 See, e.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (upholding constitutional validity of
New Jersey statute requiring nonresidents to register with Secretary of State designating such
official as agent upon whom process could be served in actions arising within state).
7 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355-57 (1927).
s See id.
19 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928).
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It is clear, however, that the fiction of "implied consent" merely
served as a transitional justification during the revision of the concept
of state jurisdictional power. 2 0 The ability of courts to render judgments in personam was further expanded in the landmark case of
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington. 21 Diverging from the historical concept of physical presence within the state as the prerequisite
for obtaining a judgment in personam, the Court established the
principle that a person beyond the territorial limits of the state could
be subject to service of process if "he ha[d] certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit [did] not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' -22 As a result of
this decision, numerous states enacted measures providing for service
of process beyond their borders. These "long-arm" provisions vastly
increased the ability of courts to render judgments in personam over
both nonresident individuals and foreign corporations, and served to
expedite litigation previously restricted by constitutional proscription
of extraterritorial service of process.2 3
The tolling provisions of most states remained in force throughout the expansion of jurisdiction afforded by service of process on a
designated agent within the state and the adoption of long-arm provisions. The major problem encountered by state courts in seeking to
harmonize the purpose and intent of the tolling statute with the subsequent amplification of in personam jurisdiction has been the failure
of state legislatures to remedy any inconsistencies. 2 4 Confronted
with suits normally barred by the statute of limitations where the
defendant was beyond the territorial boundaries of the state, yet
amenable to service of process, the various courts have struggled with
the construction of tolling statutes applicable to a "nonresident" de-

20 The later case of Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), clarified the
development of a state's jurisdiction over nonresidents in noting that "jurisdiction in these cases
does not rest on consent at all . . . . The liability rests on the inroad which the automobile has
made on the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff ....
" 346 U.S. at 340-41 (citation omitted).
21 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
23 See Kurland, The Due Process Clause and the In PersonamJurisdiction of State Courts,
25 U. Cmu. L. REV. 569 (1958).
24 Certain state legislatures, however, have responded to the situation by specificially
stipulating that the tolling provision will not apply when the defendant, although beyond the
borders of the state, can still be subjected to a judgment in personam. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 83 § 19 (Smith-Hurd 1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 207 (McKinney 1972).
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fendant, 25 his "absence from the state," 26 or his presence "out of
state." 27 Despite the difficulties posed in statutory interpretation, the
majority of states now adhere to the principle that the defendant's
amenability to service of process renders the tolling provision in28
applicable.
New Jersey, however, adopts the position maintained by a distinct minority of states that the tolling provision is unaffected by the
plaintiff's ability to serve process on the absent defendant. 29 Consistent with the minority position, New Jersey courts have declined to
depart from a literal application of the statute. 30 The inflexibility of
the language of the tolling provision, 3 1 coupled with judicial deference to the mandate of the legislature, has precluded the incorporation of recent developments in in personam jurisdiction within the
operation of the tolling statute.
The New Jersey Approach
The interplay of the New Jersey tolling provision and the expansion of state jurisdictional power over nonresidents initially arose in
the context of substituted service of process upon a designated state
official. The statute provided that an action against a nonresident
motorist could be commenced by serving the summons and complaint
on the defendant through the Director of the Division of Motor.Vehi-

25 See Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d 711 (1952); Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J.

295, 196 A.2d 523 (1963); Whittington v. Davis, 221 Ore. 209, 350 P.2d 913 (1960).
26 See Partis v. Miller Equipment Co., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Byrne v.
Ogle, 488 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1971); Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., Inc., 96 Idaho 723, 536 P.2d 291
(1975).
27 See Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964); Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509,
252 N.W. 284 (1934).
28 Cohn v. Searle, 447 F. Supp. 903, 912 n.21 (D.N.J. 1978); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 3d 1158
(1974).
29 See note 28 supra.

30 See Macri v. Flaherty, 115 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.S.C. 1953) (any exception to literal meaning of statute is matter for the legislature); Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N.J. Misc. 119, 25 A.2d
430 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (any attempt to construe language of statute to encompass effect of provi-

sions for substituted service of process is.attempting judicial legislation); Couts v. Rose, 152
Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950) (had legislature intended to exclude from operation of
tolling provision persons amenable to process it could have done so by clear language); Vaughn
v. Deitz, 430 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1968) (refuse to disturb clear meaning of tolling statute when

not in irreconcilable conflict with substituted service provision); Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509,
252 N.W. 284 (1934) (substituted service upon designated agents in state has no effect on tolling
provision).
31 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-22 (West 1952). See note 3 supra for text of statute.
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cles. 32 Such service would have the same legal effect as if served
upon the defendant personally.
The New Jersey supreme court, in the leading case of Lemke v.
Bailey, 33 addressed the applicability of the tolling statute in light of
this broadening of the service laws. There, plaintiffs sought recovery
of damages arising from an automobile accident with the defendant, a
resident of Connecticut. Suit was filed three years after the cause of
action accrued and service was effected on the defendant through the
Director of Motor Vehicles. 34 The defendant contended that since
he was amenable to service of process throughout the normal limita35
tion period, the tolling provision should not apply.
In order to ascertain the proper application of the tolling provision, the court relied upon the previous judicial interpretation of the
statute, coupled with an independent analysis of its legislative history. 36 Prior to the Lemke decision, the supreme court had determined that a nonresident's amenability to service of process could
have no effect on the operation of the tolling provision.3 7 Citing the

32 N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 39:7-2 (West 1973) provides:

(a) Any person, not being a resident of this State, who shall drive a motor
vehicle in this State, whether or not such person shall be licensed to do so in
accordance with the laws of this State or of any other State or otherwise; and
(b) Any person or persons, not being a resident or residents of this State or any
corporation or association, not incorporated under the laws of this State and not
duly authorized to transact business in this State, who by his, their or its agent or
servant shall cause to be driven in this State, any motor vehicle which is not registered in this State to be driven upon the public highways thereof, pursuant to the
laws thereof, whether or not the driver thereof shall be licensed to drive a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of this State; shall, by the operation of such motor
vehicle, or by causing the same to be operated, within this State, make and constitute the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Law and
Public Safety, his or their agent for the acceptance of process in any civil action or
proceeding, issuing out of any district court, county court, or other court of civil
jurisdiction, against any such person or persons, corporation or association arising
out of or by reason of any accident or collision occurring within this State in which
any such motor vehicle, so driven or caused to be driven within this State is involved.
Id. § 39:7-2 (West 1973).
33 41 N.J. 295, 196 A.2d 523 (1963).
34 Id. at 297, 196 A.2d at 524.
35 Id.
36 41 N.J. at 298-301, 196 A.2d at 524-26.
37 The applicability of the tolling provision in light of the provision for substituted service of
process upon a designated state official was first addressed in Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N.J.
Misc. 119, 25 A. 2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1942). The defendant in this case maintained that because he
was amenable to the ju'risdiction of the New Jersey courts throughout the limitation period he
was entitled to invoke the plea of the statute of limitations to bar the plaintiff's claim. Id. at
120-21, 25 A.2d at 432. In rejecting the defendant's contention, the court embarked upon an
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failure of the legislature to substantially alter the phraseology of the
statute, the court declined to depart from this position. 38 "The construction of a statute by the courts, supported by long acquiescence
on the part of the Legislature . . . is evidence that such construction
'3 9
is in accordance with the legislative intent."

analysis of legislative intent that laid the framework for future judicial construction of these
provisions. See note 39 infra and accompanying text. Adhering to the "plain wording" of the
tolling provision, 20 N.J. Misc. at 120, 25 A.2d at 431, the court considered any attempt to
construe the statute other than to apply it in all suits against nonresidents to be "attempting
judicial legislation." Id. at 122, 25 A.2d at 432. The court's opinion marked a prelude to a
consistent pattern of judicial deference to the literal content of the legislative enactment, while
recognizing the apparent injustice to the defendant. "Any unfairness that this situation works
against the non-resident defendant," the court remarked, "is a matter to be remedied by the
legislature and not by the courts." Id.
Subsequent to the Gotheiner decision, two cases, Whalen v. Young, 28 N.J. Super. 543,
101 A.2d 64 (Law Div. 1953), revd on other grounds, 15 N.J. 321, 104 A.2d 678 (1954), and
Ferraro v. Ferro Trucking Co., 72 N.J. Super. 519, 179 A.2d 74 (Law. Div. 1962), addressed the
operation of the statute. Each case concerned, inter alia, the applicability of the tolling provision when the defendant, allegedly liable for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, was
a foreign corporation with no formal representation within the state. The defendant corporations
in both cases were amenable to service of process through the Director of the Division of Motor
Vehicles. 28 N.J. Super. at 549, 101 A.2d at 67; 72 N.J. Super. at 521, 179 A.2d at 75.
In Whalen, the defendant alleged that the statutory designation of an agent upon whom
process could be served provided sufficient "representation" of the nonresident corporation so
as to preclude the operation of the tolling provision. Id. at 549, 101 A.2d at 67. The court
rejected this contention indicating that the purpose of the substituted service provision
lils not to relieve nonresident corporations of the legal consequences of their nonresidence. It is solely to provide a convenience in the institution of suits against
such corporations in this State for injuries arising out of the operation of their motor
vehicles within this State.
Id. at 550, 101 A.2d at 67.
The Ferraro court came to the opposite conclusion. Recognizing that "the clear weight of
authority throughout the country" was contrary to the position adopted in Whalen, 72 N.J.
Super. at 524, 179 A.2d at 77, the court proceeded to list various factors as persuasive reasons
to permit the defendant to raise the defense of the statute of limitations: the plaintiff's ability to
serve process throughout the limitation period; the plaintiff's utilization of substituted service of
process after two and one-half years; the apparent inconsistency with the purpose of the statute
of limitations; the ability of the plaintiff to defer service until the most propitious time to bring
suit; and the conflict with the underlying purpose of the tolling provision. Id.
In Lemke, the supreme court failed to resolve the conflict between these two cases. The
court indicated that it did not "have before [them] the effect of [the tolling provision] upon a
corporate defendant and therefore [would] express no opinion as to the contrary results of Whalen
and Ferraro." 41 N.J. at 301, 196 A.2d at 526. Although the Ferraro decision has since been
discredited, it has never been expressly overruled. See note 46 infra.
38 41 N.J. at 301-02, 196 A.2d at 526-27.
39 Id. at 301, 196 A.2d at 526.
To further clarify the intent of the legislature on this issue, the court pointed to a proposed
amendment, later withdrawn, which would have specifically provided that nonresident motorists
subject to service through the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles would be excluded
from the operation of the tolling provision. Id. at 299, 196 A.2d 525. Since the withdrawal of
the amendment occurred subsequent to the court's construction of the statute in Gotheiner v.
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The defendant further contended that no rational basis existed
for distinguishing between resident defendants and nonresident
motorist defendants amenable to service of process through the
statutory agent. 40 Because the tolling provision operated to deny
nonresidents the right to plead the statute of limitations, the defendant maintained that the statute created an arbitrary and discriminatory classification, 4 1 denying him the equal protection of the laws
under the federal and state constitutions. 42 The court summarily rejected the equal protection argument indicating that the defendant
had not met the burden of proving that the classification was irrational. 43 As a result of the determination that the statute as applied
was constitutional, 4 nonresident defendants, although subject to the
jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts, would be denied the protection
45
of the statute of limitations.
Lenihan, see note 37 supra, the court reasoned that "the conclusion is forced that the decision
in Gotheiner correctly expresses the legislative intent." 41 N.J. at 302, 196 A.2d at 527. For
further discussion of the Lemke court's analysis of the legislative intent underlying the tolling
provision, see notes 45 and 148 infra and accompanying text.
40 41 N.J. at 302-03, 196 A.2d at 527.
41 Id. at 302, 196 A.2d at 527.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 1, 5.
43 41 N.J. at 303, 196 A.2d at 527-28.
44 Id. at 303, 196 A.2d at 528.

45 Justice Schettino lodged a vigorous dissent contesting the statutory interpretation forwarded by the majority. He first clarified the issue by stating that "[t]he obvious purpose of the
tolling statute ... is to preserve a plaintiff's cause of action where service cannot be had on a
defendant by reason of his absence from the State." 41 N.J. 295, 303, 196 A.2d 523, 528
(Schettino, J., dissenting). Referring to the persuasive authority of courts adhering to the majority position, Justice Schettino emphasized that the application of the tolling provision in this
context would be "repugnant to the general purpose of the statute of limitations, for the plaintiff
[would be] able to defer service indefinitely." Id. at 304, 196 A.2d at 528 (Schettino, J., dissenting). Although legislative acquiescence in the court's construction of the statute is evidence of
compatibility with the will of the legislature, the dissent indicated that such acquiescence is not
the sole determinative factor in analyzing legislative intent. Id. at 304-05, 196 A.2d at 528-29
(Schettino, J.,dissenting). The dissent found it inappropriate to "attribute to the Legislature an
intent to become embroiled in the constitutional issue" raised by the defendants, due to the
absence of legislative history concerning the recall of the proposed amendment. Id. at 305, 196
A.2d at 529 (Schettino, J., dissenting).
Turning to the equal protection claim, the dissenting opinion focused on the effect of the
provision for substituted service of process upon the statutory agent and reasoned that by virtue
of this statute, residents and nonresidents amenable to service of process were similarly circumstanced in regard to the court's ability to render a judgment in personam. Id. Recognizing
this apparent equality with respect to availability for suit, Justice Schettino contended that
"[t]here thus appears to be no reasonable basis in regard to either the legislative purpose or the
general welfare to include the nonresident motorist within the operation of the tolling provision." Id. at 306, 196 A.2d at 529 (Schettino, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice maintained
that the inclusion of nonresidents amenable to service of process within the embrace of the
tolling statute created an unreasonable and arbitrary classification violating equal protection
guarantees. Id.
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Lemke established the current position of the New Jersey supreme court on the construction of the tolling provision with respect to
nonresident defendants amenable to substituted service of process
through the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles. The rationale
espoused by the court is apparently applicable to both individual and
corporate defendants." 6 Although one court has determined that the
same rationale would govern in the context of an individual defendant
amenable to long-arm service, 47 the effect of long-arm jurisdiction on
the tolling provision was not given full consideration until the issue
was confronted in the recent decisions of Cohn v. G. D. Searle &
Co., 4 s Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 4 9 and Velmohos v. Maren Engineering Corp.50 These three cases comprise the focus of this comment and illustrate the impact of long-arm jurisdiction on the New
Jersey tolling provision.
In Cohn v. G. D. Searle & Co., 51 a federal district court, applying New Jersey law, addressed the construction and application of the
tolling provision with respect to an unlicensed foreign corporate defendant. The plaintiff in this case sought recovery for personal injuries
allegedly stemming from the use of Enovid, a contraceptive drug
manufactured by G. D. Searle & Co. (Searle). The plaintiff's use of
the drug extended over a period of approximately one and one-half
years, terminating in December of 1964 when she suffered a stroke. 5 2
46 See, e.g., Blackmon v. Bovern, 318 F. Supp. 884 (D.N.J. 1956); Guas v. Guas, 146 N.J.
Super. 541, 370 A.2d 91 (Law Div. 1977); Lackovic v. New England Paper Tube Co., 127 N.J.
Super. 394, 317 A.2d 426 (Law Div. 1974); Marsh v. Davis, 99 N.J. Super. 130, 238 A.2d 709
(Law Div. 1968). But see Ferraro v. Ferro Trucking Co., 72 N.J. Super. 519, 179 A.2d 74 (Law
Div. 1962).
In Lackovic v. New England Paper Tube Co., the court refused to follow the holding of
Ferraro v. Ferro Trucking Co. See note 37 supra. The court reasoned that pursuant to N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:7-2 (West 1973), individuals were as amenable to service of process as corporations; therefore, there could be no logical basis for distinguishing the two. 127 N.J. Super. at
397-98, 317 A.2d at 428. This view is clearly supported in subsequent cases. See Hopkins v.
Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 539, 541 n.2 (D.N.J. 1978); Cohn v. Searle, 447 F. Supp.
903, 912 n.19 (D.N.J. 1978).
47 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Abagnale, 97 N.J. Super. 132, 234 A.2d 511 (Law Div. 1967)
(rationale of Lemke-amenability to process has no effect on tolling statute-applied to resident
who leaves state after cause of action accrues even though he was amenable to service of process
under long-arm rule).
4' 447 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J. 1978).
9 463 F. Supp. 539 (D.N.J. 1978).
50 168N.J. Super. 520, 403A.2d927(App. Div. 1979),certif,granted, No. 16,1 8 3(Sup. Ct. Jan. 18,
1980).
s' 447 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J. 1978).
52 Id. at 904-05. The precise date of the accrual of the plaintiff's cause of action was uncertain due to the possible application of the "'discovery" rule. Id. at 905-06. See generally Lopez
v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277
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Suit was instituted against Searle in January of 1974, service being
53
effected under New Jersey's long-arm rule.
The central issue determined by the court arose from the allegation by the defendant corporation that the tolling provision should not
54
apply because it was amenable at all times to long-arm service.
Searle contended that such amenability to service constituted sufficient "representation" of the foreign corporation within the state so as
to exclude it from the statutory classification. 5 5 Judge Meanor, in(1961). Judge Meanor reserved judgment on this issue pending the resolution.of the controversy
surrounding the operation of the tolling provision. 447 F. Supp. at 906.
53 447 F. Supp. at 904. New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4(c)(1) stipulates that service upon corporations shall be effected in the following manner:
Upon a domestic or foreign corporation, by serving . . . , either an officer,
director, trustee, or managing or general agent; or any person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation; or
the person at the registered office of the corporation in charge thereof. If service
cannot be made upon any of the foregoing, then it may be made upon the person at
the principal place of business of the corporation in this State in charge thereof, or
if there is no place of business in this State, then upon any servant of the corporation within this State acting in the discharge of his duties. If it appears by affidavit
of plaintiff's attorney or of any person having knowledge of the facts that after diligent inquiry and effort personal service cannot be made upon any of the foregoing
and if the corporation is a foreign corporation, then, consistent with due process of
law, service may be made by mailing, by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, a copy of the summons and complaint to a registered agent forservice,
or to its principal place of business, or to its registered office.
N.J.R. 4:4-4(c)(1).
Additionally, rule 4:4-4(c)(3) provides for an alternate mode of service. The rule stipulates
that:
If the addressee refuses to claim or to accept delivery of registered or certified
mail, service may be made by ordinary mail addressed to him. If for any other
reason delivery cannot be made, then service of a copy of the summons and complaint may be made outside this State as provided in R. 4:4-5(a) upon any person
upon whom service is authorized by the law of this State or of the state wherein
service is effected.
N.J.R. 4:4-4(c)(3).
5" 447 F. Supp. at 909.
Searle first argued that although it is a foreign corporation with no statutory or appointed
agent within the state, representative agents of the company servicing its New Jersey clientele
were within the statutory definition of "persons or officers" so as to preclude the operation of
the tolling statute. Id. See note 3 supra. After a detailed analysis of the 1949 amendment to the
tolling provision incorporating foreign corporations within its operation, see note 12 supra, the
court rejected this interpretation of the statute. 447 F. Supp. at 909. Noting that these agents
or "detailmen" had limited authority and operated out of their homes, id. at 907, the court
found it "inconceivable ... that the legislature intended to give the benefit of the statute of
limitations to a foreign corporate defendant whose only representation within the state was by
employees so invisible as these." Id. This result, reasoned the court, was necessitated by an
inquiry into the intent of the legislature in passing the corporation amendment, and by an analysis
of the law in New Jersey at the time of the passage of the act respecting service on foreign
corporations. Id. at 907-09.
55 447 F. Supp. at 909. See note 3 supra.
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terpreting the 1949 amendment to the tolling provision which included foreign corporations within its operation, asserted that the
amendment must be construed in light of the law in New Jersey at
the time of its passage. 56 Even though the constitutionality of extraterritorial service of process was established in International Shoe in
1945, 57 long-arm service upon foreign corporations was not available
in New Jersey until 1958.58 Based on this analysis and the narrow
construction of the tolling provision forwarded by the New Jersey
courts, 59 the Searle court reasoned that "the foreign corporation section of the tolling statute cannot be construed to encompass extraterritorial service unknown to the legislature at the time of enactment
and not within the intendment and scope of the statutory lan60
guage."
Searle further contended that if the tolling provision operates to
foreclose the defense of the statute of limitations when it was continually subject to long-arm jurisdiction, the statute acts to deny it
61
the equal protection of the laws under the Federal Constitution.
Asserting that the purpose of the tolling provision is satisfied when
the defendant is amenable to service of process, Searle argued that no
rational basis existed for the legislative classification. 62 Searle emphasized that in order to withstand an equal protection challenge the
classification must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate objective
63
of the legislature.
Addressing the practical effect of extraterritorial service of process, the court maintained that "the long-arm rule places an out-ofstate defendant on an equal footing with a resident" 64 with respect to
the court's ability to render a judgment in personam; therefore, no
rational basis existed for denying defendants amenable to service of
process the right to plead the statute of limitations. 65 In recognition
of the hardships occasioned upon a defendant in preparing an
adequate defense and the important policy considerations behind the
statute of limitations, the court found it impermissible to allow the
plaintiff to postpone suit indefinitely when the defendant at all times
56 Id. at 910. See notes 12 & 54 supra.
51 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
58 R.R. 4:4-4(d) (effective Sept. 3, 1958) (current version N.J.R. 4:4-4(c)). See note 53 supra.
59 447 F. Supp. at 909 n.12, 910.
6.

Id. at 910 (footnote omitted).

:I Id. at 910-11.
62 Id. at 911.
63

Id.

6 Id. at 912.
65

Id.
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could have been brought before the court.6 6 Judge Meanor, deferring to the wisdom of the legislature in enacting the statute, stipulated that "[w]hile the tolling statute made eminent good sense in the
days of territorial restrictions on service, it has become dated in the
instant context by modern changes in the law of in personam jurisdiction." 6 7 The classification, distinguishing resident and foreign corporations subject to service upon representative agents within the state,
and foreign corporations not so represented yet subject to service
under the long-arm rule, was declared unconstitutional by Judge
Meanor as a denial of equal protection to foreign corporations subject
to long-arm jurisdiction.6 8
The holding in Cohn was expressly rejected by a parallel federal
court in Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc. 69 As a result of injuries allegedly sustained from the explosion of a tire, the plaintiff instituted a
product liability action naming Kelsey-Hayes, the manufacturer of the
tire, as the defendant. Suit was filed nearly three years after the accident. 70 The defendant, a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in New Jersey, 71 interposed the defense of the statute of limitations in a motion for summary judgment. 72 Based on the defendant's
status as an unrepresented foreign corporation, the plaintiff contended that the tolling provision removed the bar of the statute of
limitations. 73 The defendant countered that since it was amenable to
service by registered mail pursuant to the long-arm rule, 74 the toll75
ing provision did not apply.
Clarifying the strict construction of the tolling statute expressed
by the New Jersey supreme court in Lemke, Judge Brotman declared
that "even where a non-resident corporation can easily be served by
substituted service within New Jersey, the tolling statute applies to
deny it the protection of the statute of limitations." 76 The court re66
867 id.
Id.
id.
68

Id.

69 463 F. Supp. 539, 542 (D.N.J. 1978).
70 Id. at 540.
71 Id. The licensure and registration of a foreign corporation is not required in New Jersey

pursuant to section 14A:13-3(2) of New Jersey Statutes Annotated, so long as the commercial
activities of the corporation do not rise to the level of "transacting business" in intrastate commerce. See Eli Lily Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961). Penalties are imposed upon
a corporation for failure to register if its activities bring it within the statutory classification. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-11 (West 1969).
72463 F. Supp. at 540.
73 Id. at 541.
74 N.J.R. 4:4-4(c)(1). See note 53 supra.
75 463 F. Supp. at 540-41.
76 id. at 541.
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solved that the rationale of the nonresident motorist cases was equally
applicable to service under the long-arm rule. Since the federal
courts are bound by the construction of a state statute as interpreted
by the highest court of the state, Lemke was controlling. 7 7 Determining that the tolling statute conclusively required an agent of the
corporation present within the state to suspend its operation, the
Hopkins court refused to depart from the plain meaning of the statutory language, yielding to the New Jersey Legislature the responsibility
to make any appropriate changes to encompass broadening of the serv78
ice laws.
Furthermore, the court upheld the constitutionality of the statute
as applied to a foreign corporation amenable to service of process. 79
While acknowledging the contrary holding in Cohn, the court perceived that decision to be "a substitution of [that] court's judgment on
the policies behind the tolling statute for that of the legislature." 80
According to Judge Brotman, the requisite rational basis for drawing a
distinction between defendants servable within the borders of New
Jersey and those outside the state lay in the additional hardships encountered by a plaintiff in effecting service of process on absent defendants. 8 1 Citing the Lemke court's rejection of the equal protection
argument in regard to substituted service within New Jersey, the
court stated that "[i]n our case where there are greater hardships
associated with service outside the state under a long-arm rule, a
fortiori, the distinction drawn by the tolling statute is rational and
' 82
passes constitutional muster."
The Hopkins rationale was adopted by a New Jersey court in
Velmohos v. Maren Engineering Corp.,83 a product liability action
where the defendant, an unrepresented foreign corporation, sought to
avoid the operation of the tolling provision. The plaintiff filed a complaint on June 4, 1976, claiming damages sustained by him on August
3, 1973, caused by defective equipment supplied by defendant Maren
Engineering Corp. (Maren). 84 The summons and complaint were

77 Id. at 541-42.
78 Id. at 542.
79

Id.

8o id.
81 Id.
82

Id.

s 168 N.J. Super. 520, 403 A.2d 927 (App. Div. 1979), certif. granted, No. 16,183 (Sup. Ct.
Jan. 18, 1980).
84 Id. at 522, 403 A.2d at 928.
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served by mail addressed to a registered agent of Maren in Illinois,
85
its place of incorporation.
Although recognizing the soundness of the result reached in the
Cohn decision, the Velmohos court considered Lemke to be binding
precedent. 8 6 Even though Maren was amenable to long-arm jurisdiction,8 7 and service was in fact effected through the long-arm provision
subsequent to the two year limitation period, such amenability to suit
could have no bearing on the applicability of the tolling statute. 88
Moreover, the court determined that the rejection of the equal
protection argument in Lemke coupled with the constitutional analysis
proffered in the Hopkins decision, conclusively supported "the principle that there was no unequal protection simply because the nonresident, individual or corporate, could have been served with process. ' 89 The court's analysis of the defendant's constitutional claim
was consistent with the justification for the classification forwarded in
the Hopkins case. 90 Referring to the methods of long-arm service
embodied in the court rules, the Velmohos court cited three barriers
which confronted the plaintiff in a suit against nonresidents: potential
difficulties in effecting extraterritorial service; the requirement of an
affidavit of "diligent inquiry and effort" establishing the inability to
effect personal service as a prerequisite to utilization of long-arm provisions; and proof of sufficient "minimal contacts" to render a judgment in personam. 9 ' The court, therefore, determined that "[t]he
differences in the methods of serving domestic corporations and unrepresented foreign corporations . .. furnish the rational basis for a
92
constitutional distinction in the application of the tolling statute."

85 Brief for Respondent at 5, Velmohos v. Maren Eng'r Corp., 168 N.J. Super. 520, 403
A.2d 927 (App. Div. 1979), certif granted, No. 16,183 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1980).
86 168 N.J. Super. at 524, 403 A.2d at 930. In its refusal to follow Cohn, the court conceded
that

although we may recognize that perhaps in the interest of advancing the very purposes of [the] statutes against repose the holding of Cohn should be adopted, that is
a matter of policy which our court in Lemke must have considered.
Id. (footnote omitted).
87 Id. at 523, 403 A.2d at 929. No argument was advanced by the defendant that there were
insufficient "minimum contacts" with the state of New Jersey so as to preclude a sufficient
interest in subjecting the company to its jurisdiction. Id.
88 Id. at 524-25, 403 A.2d at 929-30.
89 Id. at 526, 403 A.2d at 930.
90 Id. at 526-28, 403 A.2d at 931-32; see text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
91 168 N.J. Super. at 527-528, 403 A.2d at 931-32.
92 Id. at 528, 403 A.2d at 931-32.
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Difficulties Encountered in Effecting Service of Process as the
Justificationfor the Tolling Statute
Cohn, Hopkins, and Velmohos thus frame the instant controversy
in regard to the applicability of the tolling provision in New Jersey.
Both the Hopkins and Velmohos courts concentrated on service of
process as 'the cardinal focus of judicial inquiry into the rational basis
of the legislative classification. 93 The rationale implicit in these decisions is that the difficulties of extraterritorial service may result in the
expiration of the limitation period before the plaintiff is able to take
the requisite steps to preserve his claim. The emphasis on the
methods of service of process, however, tends to neglect current New
Jersey law with respect to the determinative factor regarding the
running of the limitation period-the commencement of the lawsuit.
In New Jersey, an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint. 94 Although the court rules require that summons issue within
ten days after filing, 95 it is well settled that dismissal for failure to
effect service within this time frame lies in the discretion of the
court. 96 The reluctance to dismiss an action stems from the recognition that "[t]he filing itself shows the proper diligence on the part of
the plaintiff which such statutes of limitation are intended to insure." 97 Equitable considerations play an important role in the exercise of the court's discretion. Extinguishment of an action is a harsh
and conclusive sanction; therefore, the plaintiff should be afforded the
opportunity to adjudicate the substantive basis of his claim when flexibility in procedural rules imposes no undue hardship on the defendant. 98 In practice, the plaintiff is granted liberal relief from the ten

93 See text accompanying notes 76-82 and 87-92 supra.

4:4-2.
95 N.J.R. 4:4-1.
94N.J.R.

96 Byrd v. Ontario Freight Lines Corp., 39 N.J. Super. 275, 276, 120 A.2d 787, 787 (App.
Div. 1956). Unless otherwise stated, an order of dismissal is without prejudice. N.J.R. 4:37-2(a).
9' Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962) (dismissal of action for improper
venue not warranted when complaint filed within limitation period).
98 X-L Liquors v. Taylor, 17 N.J. 444, 453, 111 A.2d 753, 758 (1955). The filing of a complaint provides the crucial link to the judicial process that may eliminate the harsh results
caused by the present application of the tolling statute. In those situations where service can be
effected, the courts would be spared the adjudication of stale claims. When the plaintiff, exercising due diligence, is unable to serve the absent defendant subsequent to the filing of the coiplaint, the defendant's ability to raise the defense of the statute of limitations is removed "since
a [plaintiff] who cannot effect service is entitled to have his suit remain to protect his claim
against the operation of the statute of limitations." Feuchtbaum v. Constantini, 59 N.J. 167,
173, 280 A.2d 161, 163 (1971).
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day service rule when he exerts a good faith, diligent effort to serve
the defendant. 99
Moreover, the difficulties encountered in effecting service upon
nonresident defendants are in large part ameliorated by the various
alternatives provided in the court rules 100 and by the pragnatic approach to these problems adopted by the New Jersey courts. Indeed,
the rules specifically authorize the court to order service upon the
defendant when the plaintiff exhausts the delineated procedures to no
avail. 10 1 The New Jersey courts have been receptive to a wide range
of alternate modes of service of process including: court appointment
of a private individual as authorized process server; 102 service by certified mail to the defendant's place of employment; 103 service directed to a medical malpractice insurer when the insured defendant
had removed to a foreign country subsequent to the alleged injury; 104
and court ordered service of process upon the defendant's insurance
carrier in a motor vehicle incident when the plaintiff, after diligent
effort, could not locate the defendant. 10 5 The overall effect of the
provisions for service of process upon resident and nonresident defendants is to provide a comprehensive and efficient means of establishing in personam jurisdiction responsive to the needs of the plaintiff while ensuring fundamental fairness to the defendant.
99 Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 447 F. Supp. 903, 912 n.19 (D.N.J. 1978); Cooke v. Yarrington, 62 N.J. 123, 127, 299 A.2d 400, 401 (1973); Feuchtbaum v. Constantini, 59 N.J. 167,
182, 280 A.2d 161, 166 (1971); McGaughlin v. Bassing, 51 N.J. 410, 410, 241 A.2d 450, 450
(1968); X-L Liquors v. Taylor, 17 N.J. 444, 453, 111 A.2d 753, 758 (1955).
'o9New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4 prescribes the methods in which service of the summons
and complaint shall issue in order to acquire in personam jurisdiction over persons and corporations. In regard to individuals, if personal service cannot be effected, see N.J.R. 4:4-4(a), and it
"appear[s] by affidavit of the attorney for the plaintiff or of any person having knowledge of the
facts, that, after diligent inquiry and effort, an individual cannot be served in this State," N.J.R.
4:4-4 (e), the rules provide for substituted service of process by registered or certified mail. Id.
Similarly, the rules delineate procedures to effect long-arm service over corporations in the
event that personal service upon representative agents of the corporation within the state is
impossible. N.J.R. 4:4-4(c)(1). Service can be made through ordinary mail if the individual or
corporate defendant refuses to claim the registered or certified mail. N.J.R. 4:4-4(e); N.J.R. 4:44(c). Should the foregoing measures fail, and the defendant resides outside of the state, service
can be made in another jurisdiction by an oflcer authorized to serve process in that state or by
a person specially appointed by the court for that purpose. N.J.R. 4:4-5(a).
'0' N.J.R. 4:4-4(i). "The utility of such a provision is significant in circumstances where usual
modes of service are either impossible or unduly oppressive upon the plaintiff or where the
defendant successfully evades service of process." Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules Comment
R. 4:4-4(i).
102 See N.J.R. 4:4-5(a).

103 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Katzmann, 137 N.J. Super. 106, 348 A.2d 193 (App. Div. 1975)
overruling Beca Realty v. Eisberg, 125 N.J. Super. 575, 312 A.2d 516 (Law Div. 1973).
104Muntz v. Smaily, 118 N.J. Super. 80, 286 A.2d 515 (App. Div. 1972).
105Feuchtbaum v. Constantini, 59 N.J. 167, 280 A.2d 161 (1971).
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In light of the aforementioned procedures it would seem that
modern developments facilitating extraterritorial service of process
have remedied many of the evils which fostered the need for the
tolling provision. But "a required condition precedent to valid longarm service is that there must be proof [of] such .. . minimal contacts as will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' 10 6 The requirement of proof of such contacts was cited by
the Velmohos court as an additional burden occasioned upon the
plaintiff in proceeding in an in personam action against a nonresident.1 0 7 This rationale, a factor in sustaining the rational basis of the
tolling provision, appears to signify that statutory protection is warranted to offset jurisdictional limitations. An incongruity emerges,
however, when this halting view toward the facility of proceeding
against nonresidents is juxtaposed with the established New Jersey
policy of recognizing every aspect of in personam authority over non10 8
residents permitted by the United States Constitution.
While proof of minimal contacts exists as the threshold requirement to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person, the
broad base of jurisdictional power afforded through the minimal contacts formula permits an expansive exercise of state court jurisdiction
over nonresidents in response to the practical necessities of resolving
controversies stemming from interstate transactions affecting local interests. 10 9 Jurisdiction has been predicated on a variety of transactions and occurrences 110 affording liberal relief to New Jersey plain106 Velmohos v. Maren Eng'r Corp., 168 N.J. Super. 520, 528, 403 A.2d 927, 931 (App. Div.
1979), certif. granted, No. 16,183 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1980).
107 Id.
108

Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268, 277 A.2d 207, 209 (1971).

109 Indeed, "New Jersey ... has opted for an exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents, both

corporate and individual, and in respect of both commercial and noncommercial litigation, to
the utmost limits permitted by due process." Egan v. Fieldhouse, 139 N.J. Super. 220, 223,
353 A.2d 148, 149 (Law Div. 1976).
The fact that New Jersey is aligned with the minority position with respect to the effect of
amenability to service of process on the tolling provision, see note 28 supra and accompanying
text, is particularly incongruous in light of the flexibility afforded through long-arm service provided by court rule rather than by a complex or restrictive long-arm statute. The capacity of
New Jersey courts to respond to the need for extraterritorial service commensurate with rapid
developments in transportation and commerce is reflected in the language of the court in Roland v. Modell's Shoppers World:
To paraphrase a popular song, anything any state can do under the Federal Constitution we can do, and if a state is limited by the terms of its statutes or rules, we
can do it better. Hence, we do not need to struggle with the oft difficult problems
of statutory construction faced by courts in states with detailed "long arm statutes."
Roland v. Modell's Shoppers World, 92 N.J. Super. 1, 7, 222 A.2d 110, 113 (App. Div. 1966).
110 See, e.g., Cooke v. Yarrington, 62 N.J. 123, 299 A.2d 400 (1973) (status of defendant as
New Jersey licensed driver with New Jersey automobile registration at time of accident occurring
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tiffs faced with extraterritorial claims. It is improper to assume that
the trend toward expanding jurisdictional powers removes all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts; "'1 nevertheless, the
Hopkins court was eminently correct in asserting that "the vast majority who commit torts within the state would be amenable to long-arm
service." 112

Conflict With the Policy Considerations Underlying
the Statute of Limitations
The expansion of the law of in personam jurisdiction subsequent
to the enactment of the tolling provision affords the plaintiff an efficient means to pursue his lawsuit against a nonresident and ensures
the preservation of his action if he actively pursues his claim. The
need to suspend the limitation period in all suits against nonresidents, therefore, would appear to be removed. Yet, despite the plaintiff's apparent ability to commence his action, the nonresident defendant is conclusively denied the right to interpose the defense of the
statute of limitations. The competing interests of the ability to effectively prosecute an action and the right to be free of stale claims must
be afforded equal weight in the balance of policy considerations.
To hold a plaintiff accountable for his failure to exhaust all available methods of proceeding in personaln is wholly consistent with the
policy underlying the limitation of actions. 1 13 With the exception of
the current construction of the tolling provision, diligence in the pursuit of any claim is mandated by the statute of limitations. 1 14 When
a plaintiff ascertains the relevant facts in a controversy, and is apprised of the identities of the parties allegedly liable yet "voluntarily
sleeps on his rights so long as to permit the customary period of
limitations to expire, the pertinent considerations of individual justice

in Pennsylvania); Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 277 A.2d 207 (1971) (ordering of product
from plaintiff knowing product would either be manufactured in New Jersey or purchased by
New Jersey manufacturers from another source); Blessing v. Prosser, 141 N.J. Super. 548, 359
A.2d 493 (App. Div. 1976) (advertising in travel books int~nding to cause and actually causing
effects in New Jersey); Roland v. Modell's Shoppers World, 92 N.J. Super. 1, 222 A.2d 110
(App. Div. 1966) (goods purchased in New Jersey later causing injury in Connecticut); Knight v.
San Jacinto Club, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 81, 232 A.2d 462 (Law Div. 1967) (single tortious act as
valid jurisdictional predicate).
I See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
112 Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 463 F. Supp. at 542.
"3 See generally text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
1"4 See generally, Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 299 A.2d 394
(1973); Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, 44 N.J. 100, 207 A.2d 513 (1965); Fidelity Deposit Co.
v. Abagnale, 97 N.J. Super. 132, 234 A.2d 511 (Law Div. 1967).
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as well as the broader considerations of repose, coincide to bar his
action." 115
The tolling provision, as applied in circumstances where the,
plaintiff is capable of serving an absent defendant, transgresses this
important policy consideration. While the justification advanced by
the Velmohos and Hopkins courts is not without merit, the flaw in the
statutory scheme is that the plaintiff is not even required to attempt
commencement of his action. Certainly, in many cases it is in the
plaintiff's best interest to seek a swift determination of the lawsuit.
The exemption from the statute of limitations within this context,
however, affords the plaintiff the statutory authority to invoke an
extra-judicial tactical maneuver to gain a distinct advantage over a
nonresident defendant by permitting the plaintiff to await the most
propitious time to bring suit.
Furthermore, the fact that the tolling provision encourages the
dilatory plaintiff is demonstrated in cases where the statute has been
applied. The essence of the defense of the statute of limitations is that
"[n]othing more need be shown beyond the mere lapse of time"; 116
nevertheless, the timeliness of the complaint is irrelevant in suits involving nonresident defendants. Personal injury actions instituted two
years and one day, 117 three," 8 three and one-half, 1 19 and even four
years 120 after the cause of action had accrued have been permitted
through the mechanical application of the tolling statute. Because the
operation of the statute is exclusively contingent upon the presence
or absence of the defendant in reference to the territorial boundaries'
of the state, the reason for the plaintiff's delay is effectively beyond
judicial review. 12 1 Rather than serving the important policy consideration of insulating legitimate claims from the conclusive bar of the
statute of limitations, the tolling provision sanctions that which the
statute of limitations seeks to prevent.

115Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 115, 299 A.2d 394, 396 (1973).
116 Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Abagnale, 97 N.J. Super. 132, 140, 234 A.2d 511, 516'(Law Div.
1967).
117Guas v. Guas, 146 N.J. Super. 541, 370 A.2d 91 (Law Div. 1977).
I" Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 539 (D.N.J. 1978); Lemke v. Bailey, 41
N.J. 295, 196 A.2d 523 (1963).
119Velmohos v. Maren Eng'r Corp., 168 N.J. Super. 520, 403 A.2d 927 (App. Div. 1979),
certif, granted, No. 16,183 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1980).
120 Lackovic v. New England Paper Tube Co., 127 N.J. Super. 394, 317 A.2d 426 (Law Div.
1974).
121 See notes 117-20 supra and accompanying text. These cases clearly demonstrate that the

application of the tolling provision causes the time factor to lose its significance.
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A nonresident defendant is clearly prejudiced by being denied
the right to interpose the defense of the statute of limitations. In a
suit against a nonresident, a New Jersey plaintiff may derive the benefit of the tolling statute in addition to the availability of liberal
long-arm procedures often enabling him to commence his action at
any time before or after the normal limitation period. The plaintiff
thus enjoys a dual remedy in a suit against a nonresident: the removal
of any time limitation and the ability to commence his action without
regard to the very territorial limitations that served as the justification
for the application of the tolling provision. Neither remedy encompasses a balancing of the interests of the defendant.
In suits involving the application of the tolling statute, the
procedural fairness of utilizing long-arm procedures, after the tolling
provision has removed the bar of the statute of limitations, has been
virtually ignored. 1 22 Because of the "plain meaning" of the tolling
provision, the courts are compelled to apply the statute without regard to the recent expansion of jurisdictional power. Conversely, the
courts have not questioned the plaintiff's utilization of procedures to
effect extraterritorial service of process that were wholly unknown to
the legislature at the time the tolling provision was enacted. Not only
is the nonresident defendant denied the benefit of the statute of limitations, but he may remain continuously subject to suit, even though
he resides in a foreign jurisdiction and may have long since severed
any contact with New Jersey. A nonresident defendant amenable to
service of process may be severely prejudiced if a plaintiff may bring
his action at any time without limitation. Important policy considerations concerning the "prevent[ion] [of] surprise"12 3 and the promo-

122 In many of the cases where the tolling provision was applied, however, the plaintiff had
in fact utilized substituted service or long-arm provisions to serve the absent defendant after the
normal limitation period had expired. See, e.g., Cohn v. Searle, 447 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J.
1979); Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 196 A.2d 523 (1963); Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N.J. Misc.
119, 25 A.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Velmohos v. Maren Eng'r Corp., 168 N.J. Super. 520, 403
A.2d 927 (App. Div. 1979), certif. granted, No. 16,183 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1980); Guas v.
Guas, 146 N.J. Super. 541, 370 A.2d 91 (Law Div. 1977); Marsh v. Davis, 99 N.J. Super. 130,
238 A.2d 709 (Law Div. 1968).
The Hopkins and Velmohos courts indicated that the difficulties encountered in effecting
extraterritorial service of process served as the rational basis for the legislative classification. See
text accompanying notes 76-82 & 87-92 supra. The aforementioned cases, however, clearly
demonstrate the facility of proceeding in this manner in situations where the tolling provision
has been applied. The central defect in the tolling provision is that the statute precludes judicial
inquiry into whether the particular plaintiff before the court could have commenced his action
against the nonresident defendant within the normal limitation period. Absent this determination, the statute merely serves to placate the dilatory plaintiff.
123 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1944).
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tion of the "security and stability [of] human affairs" 124 are clearly
sacrificed. The availability of long-arm jurisdiction -after the lilitation
period has expired operates to extend the rights of the plaintiff in a
manner not contemplated by the legislature in enacting the statute,
and evidences a marked contrast to the otherwise consistent judicial
policy of declining to incorporate modern developments in jurisdiction within the operation of the tolling provision.
The New Jersey Tolling Provision-A Constitutional Infirmity?
Respect for the doctrine of separation of powers, which precludes
judicial disturbance of the "plain meaning" of the tolling statute, has
constrained the courts to remove the bar of the statute of limitations
in spite of apparent injustice to the nonresident defendant. Indeed,
deference to the legislature may be the sine qua non of the statute's
continued operation. In the Cohn decision, the court engaged in a
detailed analysis of the purpose and intent of the tolling provision
and, consistent with the construction of the statute forwarded by the
New Jersey courts, reached the conclusion that amenability to extraterritorial service of process could have no effect on the statute.125
The history of the tolling provision, as interpreted by the courts, indicates that this is the avowed policy of the New Jersey Legislature.
It is upon this basis that the Cohn court addressed the constitutionality of the classification embodied in the legislative enactment. 126
In Cohn, Judge Meanor found that the statute operated to deny
equal protection to foreign corporations amenable to long-arm service, since the classification, "distinguish[ing] between domestic and
foreign corporations subject to service through representative agents
within the state and foreign corporations subject to service under the
long-arm rule, . . . bears no rational relationship to the object of the
tolling statute." 127 Conversely, the Hopkins and Velmohos courts,
upholding the constitutionality of the tolling provision, expressly rejected this equal protection analysis, relying in part upon the New

124 Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
125 Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 447 F. Supp. at 910.
126 See id. at 910-11.
127 Id. at 912. The essence of the holding is the constitutional infirmity of denying the defendant the right to plead the statute of limitations when the defendant is at all times subject to the
jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts. Id. Therefore, the rationale would be equally applicable
to absent individuals subject to service through the long-arm rule, see id. at 912 n.19, or
through substituted service of process through the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles.
See note 46 supra.
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Jersey supreme court's determination in Lemke. 128 Further analysis
of this issue is warranted due to the recent appeal of the Velmohos
29
decision. 1
It is a fundamental constitutional tenet that a legislature may
create classifications treating different classes of persons in different
ways. 130 Mere inequality or difference in treatment is not prohibited
by the equal protection clause. 131 A classification must be upheld if
some reasonable basis is advanced for the legislative determination; it
is not enough to show a lack of mathematical precision. 13 2 Absent
the promulgation of a "suspect" classification or the infringement of a
fundamental right, the applicable standard of judicial review is
whether there is a rational basis upon which the classification rests.
"[Tihe classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
'
uponIome
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 133 Clearly, the burden of demonstrating the constitutional infirmity of a statute "is extremely formidable, as is attested by the long trail of failure."134
The failure to successfully challenge the rational basis of a classifiqation stems from the essential role performed by the legislature in
analyzing a given set of facts and circumstances to shape policy determinations in consideration of the general welfare. The instant constitutional issue, however, emerges in a novel context. In enacting
the tolling provision, the legislature formulated a classification premised upon the limitations of state jurisdictional power. 1 35 Emergent circumstairces warranted legislative appraisal and action to
ameliorate a specific injustice. Changes in the law of in personam
jurisdiction, however, have subsequently altered the factual circumstances to which the legislative remedy was addressed. The potential constitutional infirmity surfaced when the legitimate objective
of the statute was undermined by the facility of extraterritorial service
of process, while the classification that once served to implement a
sound policy determination subsequently operated to deny an impor128

Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 463 F. Supp. at 542; Velmohos v. Maren Eng'r Corp.,

168 N.J. Super. at 526-28, 403 A.2d at 930-32.
129 Velmohos v. Maren Eng'r Corp., 168 N.J. Super. 520, 403 A.2d 927 (App. Div. 1979),
certif. granted, No. 16,183 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1980).
130 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S, 471, 485-87 (1970); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885).
131 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970).
132 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
123 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
14 New Jersey Restaurant Ass'n v. Holderman, 24 N.J. 295, 300, 131 A.2d 773, 776 (1957).
135 See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
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tant right to persons and corporations drawn within the jurisdiction of
the state. The statute, once sound, would appear to be stripped of its
rationality due to the nullification of the factual basis upon which it
was structured.
Few courts have addressed situations where it was alleged that
the statutory classification no longer retains its rational basis due to a
change in the circumstances to which the statute applies. In Brown v.
Merlo, l3 6 however, the California supreme court engaged in a similar
analysis when considering the constitutionality of its automobile guest
statute. 137 There, the plaintiff alleged that the justification advanced
for the statute-the protection of hospitality and the prevention of
collusive lawsuits 138 -was irrational in light of modern circumstances
bearing on the issue. The denial of the right to recover for the,negligence of another, a right generally afforded to other California citi39
zens, thus deprived the plaintiff of the equal protection of the law. 1
Recognizing the widespread effect of liability insurance and the
infirmity of the "protection of hospitality" rationale in light of contemporary standards, 140 the court emphasized that the proper test of
constitutionality "is whether a statute's classification bears a rational
relation to a legitimate state interest; a classification which once was
rational because of a given set of circumstances may lose its rationality if the relevant factual premise is totally altered."141 Concluding
that the guest statute did not bear a substantial and rational relation
to its purpose, the court declared the statute unconstitutional as a
denial of equal protection to passengers who paid no compensation.
The Merlo court found the statute unconstitutional only after a
detailed examination of its purported relation to a legitimate legislative objective. This mode of analysis is readily distinguishable from

136 8 Cal. 3d 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973).
137 CA.L. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1971). The statute operated to deprive non-paying au-

tomobile passengers of the protection against negligently inflicted injury; only the willful misconduct or intoxication of the driver would be actionable pursuant to the statute. Id.
138 8 Cal. 3d at 859, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 390, 506 P.2d at 214.
139 Id. at 883, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407, 506 P.2d at 231.
140 Id. at 864-73, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394-400, 506 P.2d at 218-24.
141 Id. at 870, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 506 P.2d at 222. Accord, Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935) (statute valid when enacted may become invalid due to changes in
circumstances to which law applies); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924) (law
depending on existence of emergency or other state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if
emergency ceases or facts change even though valid when passed); Milnot v. Richardson, 350 F.
Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972) (introduction of new products creates new factual situations which
court should reconsider in determining constitutionality of regulatory statute as applied to Milnot).
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that afforded to the New Jersey tolling provision. 142 The Hopkins
and Velmohos courts, citing the difference in the methods of serving
resident and nonresident defendants as the justification for the statute, did not question whether the provisions relating to service upon

142

The California supreme court's recent examination of its tolling provision, CAL. CIV.

CODE § 351 (West 1971), also evidences a departure from the cogent analysis utilized in Merlo.

In Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219, 591 P.2d 509 (1979), the defendant
in a personal injury action was absent from the state for a period of five weeks during the one
year limitation period, yet amenable at all times to service of process. 23 Cal. 3d at 632-33, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 221, 591 P.2d at 511. The tolling statute suspended the limitation period during
the defendant's absence from the state. Adhering to a literal reading of the statute, the Dew
court rejected the defendant's contention that amenability to service of process rendered the
tolling provision inapplicable. Id. at 633-36, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 221-23, 591 P.2d at 511-13.
Additionally, the court denied the defendant's allegation that the tolling statute infringed
his constitutional right to travel freely. Id. at 636, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223, 591 P.2d at 513. After
concluding that the statute did not penalize the exercise of a fundamental right, the court
further emphasized that a rational basis for the classification could be found in that "[t]he legislature may justifiably have concluded that a defendant's physical absence [from the state] impedes his availability for suit .... ." Id. at 636-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223, 591 P.2d at 513-14.
The court's reluctance to challenge the statute's relation to a valid state purpose was premised, in part, on the fact that the legislature had modified the applicability of the tolling
provision in specified instances. Id. at 634-35, 635 n.8, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 222, 222 n.8, 591 P.2d
at 512, 512 n.8. The changes in the operation of the statute evidenced the legislature's recognition that the defendant's amenability to service of process may remove the need for the tolling
provision in some circumstances. Id. In that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the
tolling statute and the statutes providing for extraterritorial service of process, the court was
unwilling to disrupt the legislature's judgment concerning the situations in which the tolling
provision should be applied. Id. at 635-36, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23, 591 P.2d at 513.
Prior to the Dew decision, however, a California court addressed the operation of the
tolling provision in light of a nonresident's amenability to service of process through the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles. In Bigelow v. Smik, the court of appeals held that:
since a nonresident motorist is amenable to service of process within the state and
to the entry of personal judgment against him, the reason for [the tolling provision]
is not present, the section does not apply, and the period of limitation for coinmencing suit against him does not suspend.
6 Cal. App. 3d 10, 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613, 616 (1970).
The court reached this conclusion only after determining the proper construction of a statute, CAL. VEH. CODE § 17463 (West 1971), which stipulated that the statute of limitations
continues to run in an action against a resident motorist who is absent from the state but who
can be served through the substituted service statute. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 11-15, 85 Cal. Rptr. at
614-16. Since a nonresident motorist amenable to substituted service of process was as liable to
the entry of a personal judgment as a resident motorist, the court indicated that there was no
reason to suspend the running of the limitation period against the nonresident. Id. at 13, 85
Cal. Rptr. at 615. The court's willingness to construe the statute in light of its underlying
purpose evidences a significant contrast to the cautious approach adopted in Dew.
Thus, the California position is consistent with the Hopkins and Velmohos rationale in regard to amenability to service of process through long-arm jurisdiction. But, through judicial
construction, California adopts a position contrary to the Leinke rationale. While this approach
recognizes the infirmity of suspending the limitation period when the plaintiff can proceed
through service upon the designated state official, the application of the tolling provision without
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nonresidents ensured the fundamental purpose of the tolling
143
provision-the preservation of the plaintiff's action.
The court's unwillingness to review the rationality of a statute
stems from an aversion to judicial intrusion into areas reserved for
legislative judgment. A representative government mandates that the
legislature promulgate governing policies. When faced with challenges to these policies, "the further removed a judge's private ekperience is from the . . . scene in which a law is to function, the
greater will be his reluctance to conclude that a claimed factual basis
is merely fanciful."144 The instant constitutional issue, however, is
unique in that the statute in question does not involve economic or
social welfare legislation, areas characteristically immune from judicial
appraisal, but concerns circumstances in which the legislature formulated a policy to protect a resident plaintiff from procedural limitations affecting his ability to pursue his action in the New Jersey
courts.
In determining the constitutionality of the tolling provision, the
evil of judicial intervention into areas reserved to the legislative
branch is somewhat alleviated due to the recognition that matters of
practice and procedure are the business of the court. The New Jersey
Constitution of 1947 conferred upon the supreme court sole rule making power in the area of practice and procedure 145 "thus . . . impos-

regard to the plaintiff's ability to commence his action utilizing long-arm service of process
suffers from the same deficiences as the New Jersey tolling provision.
143 The Lemke decision is perhaps the most obvious example of this cautious approach to
judicial inquiry. Rejecting the defendant's equal protection argument, the court determined that
the defendant had not met the burden of proving that the classification was irrational. Lemke v.
Bailey, 41 N.J. at 303, 196 A.2d at 528. Various factors presented to the court, however, illuminated the infirmity of applying the tolling statute in situations where the nonresident may be
served through the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles. The availability of substituted
service of process upon the absent defendant places the nonresident on an equal footing with
resident defendants. Cohn v. Searle, 447 F. Supp. at 912. See Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. at
305-06, 196 A.2d at 529 (Schettino, J., dissenting). Service of process is relatively easy. The
plaintiff in this situation is not required to leave the state and is fully apprised of the location
where a copy of the summons and complaint may be directed to efficiently serve the nonresident. See note 32 supra. The court's failure to evaluate the practical effect of this mode of
service of process, the application of the tolling provision without regard to the plaintiff's ability
to proceed, and the indifference to the important policies underlying the statute of limitations,
evidences an approach to statutory purpose inconsistent with the role of the judiciary as defender of constitutional guarantees.
I" New Jersey Restaurant Ass'n v. Holderman, 24 N.J. 295, 301-02, 131 A.2d 773, 777
(1957).
145 N.J. CONST., art. 6, § 1I, para. 3. The provision stipulated that "[tihe Supreme Court shall
make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the
practice and procedure in all such courts." Id. For an analysis of the ramifications of this grant
of authority see Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
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[ing] on [it] the responsibility for seeing that the judicial system
functioned effectively in the public interest." 146 If the justification
advanced for the statute is premised on procedural limitations that
hinder the maintenance of suits against nonresidents, the New Jersey
supreme court has the authority, indeed the responsibility, to determine whether these limitations are rationally based on the realities of
current practice and procedure of the New Jersey court system. It is
not contended that this grant of authority empowers the court to
override the legislative enactment. 14 7 The responsibility to administer the courts in the public interest, coupled with the duty to uphold
the constitution, however, warrants a cogent determination of
whether the current operation of the tolling provision, in light of
modern procedures available to New Jersey plaintiffs, comports with
the intendment of the statute.
The Role of Statutory Interpretation
Due to the impact of prior judicial interpretations of the inflexible language of the tolling provision and the apparent legislative acquiescence in the court's construction of the statute, 148 it would seem

146 Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 244, 74 A.2d 406, 408 (1950).
147The Winberry decision involved an analysis of the phrase "subject to law" embodied in
the grant of rule-making power to the supreme court. See note 145 supra. The central issue in
this case was whether the phrase "subject to law" meant subject to overriding legislation. Although the parameters of the decision may still be less than clear, the court held that *[a]n
analysis of the Constitution serves to convince us that the phrase 'subject to law' cannot be
taken to mean subject to legislation." 5 N.J. at 245, 74 A.2d at 408.
14 The proposition that judicial construction of a statute, followed by the absence of legislation disturbing that interpretation, evidences legislative acquiescence in the court's construction
is not universally accepted. The proposition was succinctly stated in Barringer v. Miele:
The construction of a statute by the courts, supported by long acquiescence on the
part of the Legislature, or by continued use of the same language, or failure to
amend the statute, is evidence that such construction is in accordance with legislative intent.
Barringer v. Miele, 6 N.J. 139, 144, 77 A.2d 895, 899 (1951). Accord, Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J.
at 301, 196 A.2d at 526; see note 39 supra and accompanying text; Egan v. Erie R.R. Co., 29
N.J. 243, 250-252, 148 A.2d 830, 834 (1955); State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 60, 104 A.2d 21, 35
(1954) (Oliphant, J.,dissenting). Compare the contrary position adopted by the court in State v.
Sands:
Two rules of construction have been advanced to explain legislative inaction. One is
that inaction signifies acquiescence in the judicial interpretation . . . .The other is
that "[lI]egislative inaction can mean only that the Legislature did not act." We
incline to the latter view.
State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 137 n.1, 386 A.2d 378, 383 n.1 (1975) (quoting Donaldson v. Board
of Educ., 65 N.J. 240-41 n.*, 320 A.2d 857, 859 n.* (1974) (citation omitted)). See White v.
Township of N. Bergen, 77 N.J. 538, 557, 391 A.2d 911, 921 (1978).
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that there are formidable barriers to judicial reappraisal of the operation and application of the tolling provision. The New Jersey supreme
court, however, is not powerless to review its prior interpretation of a
statute, particularly when the legislature has taken no affirmative ac4 9
tion in regard to the statute.1
If the response of the legislature is less than clear, the statute's
underlying purpose and intent may offer guidance in construing the
tolling provision. Whereas "the intent expressed in [a statute] is a
judicial question with respect to which the inaction of subsequent
legislatures is not dispositive," 150 judicial re-evaluation of the legislative enactment may be facilitated if the clear purpose of the statute is
not being served. This, perhaps, is most relevant in the instant controversy where adherence to legislative acquiescence, as the expression of the will of the legislature, violates another important policy
consideration. Through deference to the unexpressed desires of the
legislature, the important policies behind the statute of limitations are
wholly sacrificed.' 5 1 To bestow upon the legislature an intent
through silence presumes it would sacrifice a vital element of sound
jurisprudence without an explicit affirmation of the policies upon
which the decision is premised.
149 See White v. Township of N. Bergen, 77 N.J. 538, 391 A.2d 911 (1978). In White, the
court considered the interpretation of a statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-51 (West 1972),
authorizing the award of back pay to discharged civil service employees who were subsequently
determined to have been wrongfully terminated. The primary issue decided by the court was
that the common law doctrine of mitigation should apply to the award, reducing the amount by
any salary earned in the interim. White v. Township of N. Bergen, 77 N.J. 538, 561-62, 391
A.2d 911, 923 (1978).
Two factors bearing on the court's reappraisal of the statute are closely analogous to the
difficulties posed in a reinterpretation of the tolling provision. First, the court contended with
the powerful doctrine of stare decisis. Prior to White, the supreme court, in McGrath v. City of
Jersey City, held that the same statute permitted an award of back pay without regard to the
mitigation factor. McGrath v. City of Jersey City, 38 N.J. 31, 32, 183 A.2d 7, 8 (1962). Drawing
on the power of the court to overrule its prior decisions in the interest of justice, Chief Justice
Hughes emphasized that the judiciary is not bound "to accept the hereditary transfer of now
visible defects in justice, from generation to generation ....
[T]he court, as well as the Legislature, has authority to intervene against [the] operation of any such fallacy." White v. Township of N. Bergen, 77 N.J. 538, 551-52, 391 A.2d 911, 918 (1978).
The second issue confronted by the court was the contention that the failure of the legislature to revise the language of the statute subsequent to the judicial interpretation in McGrath,
evidenced the legislature's approval of the court's previous construction of the statute. Id. at
554-57, 391 A.2d at 919-21 (1978). Citing Lemke as a proponent of the proposition that legislative inaction signifies acquiescence in the judicial interpretation of a statute, the White court
rejected that rationale as applied to the situation before it. Id. at 556, 391 A.2d at 920 (1978).
For further discussion of the role of legislative acquiescence in the judicial construction of a
statute see note 148 supra.
150 State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 137-38 n.1, 386 A.2d 378, 383 n.1 (1975).
151See text accompanying notes 113-21 supra.
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Conclusion
The operation of the New Jersey tolling provision is in need of
revision. Despite fundamental changes in the concept of state jurisdictional power, the legislature has failed to alter its rigid statutory
mandate applicable to suits involving nonresident persons and corporations. Silence on the part of the legislature has created, in the opinion of one federal court, 15 2 a constitutional infirmity rendering the
current operation of the statute violative of the equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution. 153
The New Jersey supreme court, in addressing the constitutionality of the tolling provision upon its review of the Velmohos decision,
must determine whether the application of the statute in suits involving nonresidents amenable to process comports with the purpose and
intent of the legislative enactment. Empowered to administer the
courts in areas of practice and procedure, the supreme court has the
factual wherewithal at its disposal to determine whether the facility of
extraterritorial service of process, and judicial flexibility in situations
where the statute of limitations threatens extinguishment of an action,
has removed the rational basis for the statutory classification.
In maintaining an action against a nonresident defendant, the
plaintiff should not be permitted to allow the statute of limitations to
expire and then utilize procedures to serve the absent defendant with
no showing that these very procedures could not facilitate commencement of the action at any time during the normal limitation
period. A statute that serves to placate the dilatory plaintiff while
denying an important right to a nonresident defendant is an anamoly
in a jurisdiction noted for progressive developments in the law corresponding to the changes in the circumstances to which the law
applies.
Michael F. Quinn

152
153

Cohn, 447 F. Supp. 903 (1978).
Id. at 912; see text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.

